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Goods are of little use unless they can be  put in the hands of  the ultimate 
consumers, Some direct sales are still observed, but the vast majority of con- 
sumable goods are channeled through middlemen specialists who facilitate the 
movement of  goods in time and space, consummate mutually advantageous 
exchanges by  matching buyers and sellers, and supply product information 
and ancillary services that reduce transaction costs. Retailers rarely charge 
explicit prices for their services that  are demanded by  both producers and 
consumers. They earn their remuneration by  introducing a spread between 
retail prices and wholesale costs. 
Wholesale and retail trade, which accounted for only 6.1 percent of total 
employment in  1880, provided fully 20.6 percent of all jobs in  1980. The size 
of the distribution sector is considerably smaller when size is measured not by 
employment but by man-hours, labor costs, or value added. Whatever metric 
we use, the share of the economy’s resources allocated to distribution is stead- 
ily growing. Wallis and North (1986) defined a broader concept of  a transac- 
tion sector that dealt with both the exchange of goods and the protection and 
enforcement of  property rights. They estimated that in  1970 over half of the 
nation’s resources were allocated to the transaction sector. 
Economic theory has largely neglected the distributive trades. Henry Smith 
(1948), W.  Arthur Lewis (1970), and Bob R. Holdren (1960) represent some 
notable exceptions who mainly examined the place of the retail establishment. 
Stores in these models are differentiated by location and behave like firms in a 
monopolistically competitive industry. Bucklin (1  972) and Ingene and Lusch 
(1981) directed attention to the consumer who has  to devote time and  re- 
sources to shopping. As  individuals acquired more cars and bigger houses, 
they changed their shopping behavior, which,  in turn, affected the derived 
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demand for retail services. Average transaction sizes got larger, and so, in 
combination with  the economies of  massed reserves, provided an  environ- 
ment that encouraged the development of large supermarkets. National adver- 
tising of standardized brands lowered search costs for customers who now had 
less incentive to inspect goods. They had less to gain by  relying on the repu- 
tation of  the Broadway to  stock  good underwear. They could  simply buy 
Jockey. Some retail functions that were previously performed by retailers were 
shifted forward to consumers and others backward to producers. Stores are 
open longer, and retail clerks have less store-specific  human capital. The prod- 
uct lines of  supermarkets have been greatly expanded; those of  gasoline ser- 
vice  stations have  been  narrowed.  The  changing structure of  the  service 
bundle supplied by retail firms and the economies of massed reserves compli- 
cate the problem of  measuring productivity for the distribution sector. The 
received theory of production has to be augmented by including the inputs of 
consumers and producers in measuring the rate of technical progress. 
4.1  Growth of the Distributive 'kades 
When each household was largely self-sufficient, there was little need for 
the services of middlemen. Technological advances in transportation, agricul- 
ture,  and manufacturing were responsible for the division of  labor and the 
growth of  large-scale enterprises. The propensities to truck, barter, and ex- 
change expanded as resources were specialized. More transactions were re- 
quired to move goods to their highest valued uses, and these could be more 
efficiently performed by  specialists and institutions that make up  the sector 
called the distributive trades. 
The growth of this sector was documented by Harold Barger (1955) in Dis- 
tribution's Place in the American Economy. In 1900, 62.0 percent of the 29.1 
million persons in the labor force were in the goods-producing industries (ag- 
riculture, forestry, and fisheries, construction, mining, and manufacturing); 
only 8.2 percent were engaged in distributing goods. By  1980, only 26.5 
percent were producing goods, and 25.5 percent were employed in wholesale 
and retail trade; confer table 4.1  .I For every 100 persons who were producing 
goods in 1880, 8.6 workers were employed in distributing those goods. This 
figure climbed to 13.2 in 1900, 46.4 in  1950, and 77.1 in 1980. This dramatic 
shift in the industrial affiliation of the labor force overstates the sectoral real- 
location of  labor. Head counts ignore differences in the length of  the work 
week and the skill mix of the work force. Over the period, 1900-1980,  aver- 
age weekly hours in the goods-producing industries fell from 51 hours to 40.9 
hours, compared to a drop from 65 hours to 32.3 hours in trade. The ratio of 
1.  The first two columns, which were taken from Barger, refer to the labor force; the last two 
columns are census data on employed persons. The two series are not strictly comparable. To the 
extent that unemployment rates by industry vary, they could result in slightly different percentage 
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Table 4.1  Employment, Hours, and Earnings by Major Industry, 1900-1980 
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Sources: Employees, hours, and earnings 1900-1940 are taken from Harold Barger (1955); tables 
1 and 5, and Al. Data for  1950 and  1980 obtained from Historical Statistics and  Statistical 
Abstract ofthe U.S. (selected issues). 
Note:  n.a.  = not available. 
*Other industries include services, construction, government, and so forth. 
'Ratio  is defined as employment in trade divided by employment in goods producing industries. 
the labor inputs in trade and the goods-producing industries measured by em- 
ployment counts, (EJE,)  rose from .136 in 1900 to .771 in 1980, but when 
this ratio is measured  in man-hours,  (MT/MG),  it climbed from .ll to .61.* 
The quality of  labor has improved over time, but these improvements have 
2.  The data shown in table 4.1 pertain to hours paid rather than hours actually worked. Em- 
ployees in retail trade receive fewer paid holidays and vacations. K. Kunze reported that in 1985 
the ratio of hours actually worked to hours paid (H,/H,) was 0.914 in manufacturing and 0.964 in 
retail trade. The secular decline in this ratio was surely steeper in the goods-producing industries. 
If we could have measured man-hours actually worked, the labor input ratio would have been less 
than 0.61 in  1980. 164  Walter Y. Oi 
been uneven across sectors. Three bits of evidence suggest that there has been 
a decline in the relative quality of the retail work force. First, the percentage 
of  women in the work force increased for the economy as a whole, but  the 
increase was even greater in retail trade. Many  of  the retail jobs that were 
created in the postwar period were filled by  women and teenagers who were 
new  entrants with  little work experience. Second, part-time employees ac- 
counted for 13.0 percent of all employed persons in 1950 and 20.9 percent in 
1980. In  manufacturing, the reliance on part-timers changed little, from 8.5 
to 9.6 percent. However, it nearly doubled in retail trade, climbing from 12.5 
to 24.5 per~ent.~  The rapid growth in the use of part-timers can, I believe, be 
explained by the changing nature of retail transactions. Third, the greater use 
of  less skilled employees is corroborated by  the data on relative wages. In 
1900, the  wage  index  shown at “ratio,  100 (tradeigoods)” under “average 
hourly earnings” in table 4.1 was 136.7, meaning that retail employees earned 
hourly wages that were 36.7 percent above the wages of  employees in the 
goods-producing industries. This wage  index fell to 90.6 in  1950, and by 
1980 wages in retail trade were 25.4 percent below the wages in the goods- 
producing industries. This decline is even sharper when manufacturing is the 
comparison group, as shown in the next row of table 4.1. At least three factors 
contributed to this drop in relative wages: (a)  employment within retail trade 
shifted toward the low-wage three-digit industries; (b)  the relative demands 
for part-timers and females who are paid lower wages climbed faster in retail 
trade; and (c) retail trade unions lost much of  their market power. Adjusting 
the labor input for these quality changes would bring down the estimate of the 
growth of distribution. 
Another measure  of  the  resource reallocation can  be  gleaned  from  the 
value-added data. From 1950 to 1980, the share of total GNP generated by the 
goods-producing industries fell from 41.1 percent to 3 1.9 percent. The ratio 
of value added in trade to that in manufacturing, (VA,~~)VA,,~)  climbed from 
.725 in 1970 to .786 in 1987.4  These data still indicate a relative growth of the 
distribution sector, but the size of the growth is far smaller than that indicated 
by  employment counts. 
Greater specialization was accompanied by  a rise in the fraction of  goods 
handled by middlemen. The proportion of consumable goods passing through 
retail outlets increased from 72 percent in 1869 to 87 percent in 1929. A faster 
rate of technical progress in producing goods also contributed to a movement 
of resources away from the goods-producing sector. The Bureau of  Labor Sta- 
tistics (BLS) has assembled data on output measured by value added X,  em- 
3. The three-digit industries  within retail  trade  exhibited considerable dispersion in  the per- 
centage of employees on part-time work schedules.  Over the  1950-80  period, it climbed from 
11.4 percent to 39.1 percent in general merchandise stores, 26.6 percent to 45.3 percent in food 
and dairy stores, and 8.9  percent to 26.9 percent in gasoline service stations. 
4. The value-added data were taken from table 9.12  in the Economic Report ofthe President, 
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ployment E, and total hours H.  These data shown in panel A of table 4.2 allow 
us to measure the relative importance of four sectors: goods G, manufacturing 
M,  wholesale trade WT, and retail trade RT. The patterns are slightly different 
from those indicated by table 4.1, but they confirm the relative growth of the 
distributive trades. Labor productivity measured by output per hour in panel 
B, increased at an annual rate of 2.60 percent in goods, 2.69 for manufactur- 
ing, 2.45 for wholesale trade, and only 1.76 percent for retail trade. The time 
path of labor productivity for the entire period, 1947-87,  is presented in figure 
4.1. At  the three-digit level, the BLS embraces a sales measure of  output. 
These data are shown in table 4.3 for food stores E  department stores D,  and 
gasoline service stations G.5  Between 1967 and 1987, total output in constant 
dollar sales increased by  35.0 percent for food stores, 124.5 percent for de- 
partment stores, and 50.3 percent for gas stations. Labor productivity (output 
per hour) grew at annual rates of 0.72 percent for food stores, 3.09 for depart- 
ment stores, and 4.00 for gas stations.6 
Using a sales measure of  output, Ratchford and Brown (1985) estimated 
that for the period 1959-79  total factor productivity (TFP) increased at a rate 
of 0.47 percent a year for food stores, and at 2.07 percent for manufacturing.’ 
The slower growth rate of TFP in food stores in relation to manufacturing led 
these authors to conclude that in the years ahead an increasing share of  the 
economy’s resources will have to be devoted to distribution. I shall argue that 
not all the productivity changes are the results of  exogenous technical prog- 
ress, but they can, in part, be traced to changes in the organization of produc- 
tion. 
4.2  The Output of a Retail Firm 
Firms  engaged  in  producing  goods-extruding  aluminum,  fermenting 
grapes,  or  growing  catfish-must  establish channels through  which  their 
goods can reach the ultimate consumer. Direct sales by farmers and manufac- 
turers were not uncommon at the turn of the century. In  such an economy of 
vertically integrated firms, there is little need for a distribution sector. How- 
5. Hall, Knapp, and Winsten (1961) used a sales measure of output that assumes a fixed pro- 
portions technology. Changes  in the gross margin are attributed to changes in input prices.  A 
margins or  value-added measure of output assumes that changes in the gross margin are due to 
changes in the services supplied by the store. Input prices are presumed to move in proportion to 
changes in retail prices. 
6.  These growth rates are the regression coefficients of log-linear trend equations using all of 
the available data. The r-statistics are reported in parentheses in table 4.3. 
7.  TFP based on a margins measure of output led to a rate of technical progress of 0.34  percent 
a year. The TFP based on a sales measure of output fluctuated over the two decades. It grew at a 
rate of  1.20 percent a year for the first seven years 1959-66,  slowed to 0.91 percent for the next 
six years 1966-72,  and actually declined at a rate of  -0.62  percent for the 1972-79 period. The 
BLS estimates of output per hour in food stores also fell during the decade of the 1970s. Ratchford 
and Brown controlled for changes in the sales mix by constructing weighted averages of the annual 
rates of  change in sales for three departments-groceries,  meats, and produce. 166  Walter Y. Oi 
Table 4.2  BLS Measures of Productivity by Major Industry 
Goods  Manufacturing  Wholesale  Retail 
A. Percentage distribution by industry: 
1950  50.1 
1970  46.0 
1987  39.0 
1950  52.5 
1970  43.3 
1987  31.9 
1950  53.1 
1970  44.7 




B. Index of output per hour (1977 = 100): 
1950  46.8 
1970  88.7 
1987  120.8 
C. Annual growth rate, 1950-87: 
output  2.55 
Employment  0.17 
Hours  -0.05 

















































Table 4.3  Index of Output per Hour (selected retail industries) 
Food Stores  Department Stores  Gas Stations 
Index of output: 
1958  66.8  N.A.  N.A. 
1967  85.2  64.6  75.4 
1979  103.5  107.7  94.5 
1987  115.0  145.0  111.3 
Index of  output per hour: 
1958  72.0 
1967  95.5  77.2  63.2 
1979  98.3  104.4  107.4 
1987  92.8  137.2  145.7 
Slope  ,0072  ,0309  ,0400 
Regression of log output per hour: 
r-value  4.10  27.60  49.63 
Period  1958-1987  1967-1987  1963-1987 
Nore; n.a.  = not available. 167  Productivity in Distributive Trades 
120.207- 
- 
v  - 
-  2 
- 
71.9828 - 
A. Nonfarm Business 
113.8671 - ---- ---.  HOURS/EMPLOYEE  -- 
-\ '--  HOURS/EMPLOYEE 
\  '-* 
...=  OUTPUT/HOUR 
.. 
*** 
I  I  I  I  1 
A. Nonfarm Business 





.**  OUTPUT/HOUR 
...* 
67.94 - 
1  1  1  I  I 
1  30 
Year 
1  1  1  I  I 
1  30 
Year 168  Walter Y. Oi 
ever, as specialization developed, the number of transactions increased at an 
exponential  rate. The emergence of  a distribution  sector was a logical step 
toward the goal articulated by 0.  E. Williamson (1979), namely, to minimize 
the sum of production  and transaction costs. Retail firms today supply com- 
posite  bundles of  services that  may  include  some or all  of  the  following: 
( 1) exchange-they  consummate transactions that transfer property rights to 
the goods that they handle; (2) a product line-they  assemble and display an 
array of goods that are made available to customers, and they jointly supply 
product information; (3) convenience-they  offer this product line at a loca- 
tion and time (store hours) that have the effect of reducing transaction costs; 
(4) ancillary services-they  sometimes provide delivery, credit, and implicit 
warranties; and (5) production-they  may engage in packaging and process- 
ing goods to put them in a more suitable form for the customer.* The derived 
demand for retail services depends not only on the consumer demands for final 
goods but also on the mix of services that are jointly supplied by the retailer. 
If  a store buys local advertising or sets aside shelf space for displays, it may 
obtain price concessions from the manufacturer. Self-service establishments, 
especially cafeterias, realize lower gross margins because they are supplying 
fewer point-of-sale services. Variations in the quantity and quality of services 
can result in a dispersion of retail prices across stores and over time. 
4.3  Technology and the Economies of Massed Reserves 
A production function usually refers to a technical relation describing how 
inputs of  labor and capital can be transformed  into an output, f(L,K) = X. 
However, the production of retail services shares many of the properties that 
characterize the production of  education and transport services. It differs from 
manufacturing  in  at  least  two  important  respects:  First,  the  consumer- 
customer supplies an essential input that has to appear as an argument along- 
side labor and capital, yielding a function,f(l, K,  N)  = X.  Second, demands 
are random, and delays are costly and result in a stochastic output. Producing 
a person trip from Oblong to Normal calls for the inputs of both the trip taker 
as well as the transport mode. The duke of Buccleuch and one moral philoso- 
pher constituted the inputs that produced one qualified student who could ma- 
triculate  at  Oxford. Without a customer,  a retail  firm could  not  produce  a 
transaction  which is the raison  d’Ctre for its existence. Time and resources 
have to be allocated to shopping, to search for the right product or the proper 
price, and to arrange to get the goods home. We usually carry our fresh fish 
home but ask to have our firewood delivered. Local advertising can obviously 
reduce search costs. The particular functions that are performed by the retailer 
8.  A retailer who jointly supplies delivery and credit is engaging in downstream vertical inte- 
gration into transportation and finance. Making baked goods, prepared salads, and canned goods 
under private labels exemplifies upstream vertical integration.  Lunch counters at variety stores 
and baby nurseries at department stores are other examples mentioned by Barger. 169  Productivity in Distributive Trades 
and those that are left to the customer or manufacturer jointly determine the 
output of the retail trade sector. 
A retail  firm ordinarily  acquires the property  rights to the goods it sells. 
(Exceptions are goods sold on consignment and  sometimes catalog  sales.) 
Stores maintain inventories,  hire clerks, and stay open even when they have 
no customers. On the other side of the exchange, customers may have to wait 
to be served. Someone or something is almost always waiting. Idle resources 
are, however, productive when they are in a state of what W.  H. Hutt (1939) 
called “pseudo-idleness.’’ All idleness could, in principle, be eliminated, but, 
to accomplish  this,  the synchronization  of  the  arrival  rates  of  customers, 
clerks, and just-in-time  inventories would be prohibitively expensive. We can 
find idle resources in the goods-producing industries, but neglecting this idle- 
ness appears to pose no serious analytic or empirical difficulties.  This is not 
so for the distributive trades. 
The cost functions of retail firms exhibit increasing returns that can, in part, 
be traced to the economies of  massed reserves.  E. A. G. Robinson  (1958) 
pointed out that these economies are a consequence of  the coordination and 
synchronization  of activities that can be achieved only by  large firms. They 
do not result from the law of large numbers.  A clearer exposition of this dis- 
tinction was provided by J. G. Mulligan (1983) and A. S. DeVaney (1976). 
These economies of massed reserves characterize the production function ap- 
plicable to a retail firm. 
Retailing is, in some respects, similar to the repairman’s pr~blem.~  In this 
problem, a firm has M  machines. The probability of a breakdown follows a 
Poisson distribution with a mean arrival rate of A. The time required to repair 
a machine is exponentially distributed with a mean service time p..  If the firm 
employs only one repairman, there  is some probability po that  none of  the 
machines will need servicing. In this event, the repairman is idle. If  two or 
more  machines breakdown,  a queue develops,  and unproductive,  idle ma- 
chines have to wait to be repaired. The addition of a second repairman raises 
labor costs but reduces the opportunity costs of idle machines. If  A and CI. are 
technically fixed, one can solve for the optimum ratio of  machines to repair- 
men (M/R),  which minimizes the sum of idle times of machines waiting to be 
repaired and of repairmen waiting for the arrival of a broken machine. 
M 
R 
= 1  + (;)-I 
- 
This problem is isomorphic to one where a hospital serves a population of M 
potential patients who arrive to be treated.  A Poisson distribution describes 
the probability  of  the number  of patient  arrivals.  If  the mean duration of  a 
hospital stay is k,  the sum of waiting times (empty beds waiting for patients 
9. This is one of  the queuing models analyzed by Gross and Harris (1974). Economic applica- 
tions can be found in DeVaney (1976), Arrow, Levhari, and Sheshinski (1972), Syrquin (1972), 
and Levhari and Sheshinski (1970). 170  Walter Y. Oi 
and sick patients lining up for a vacancy) is a minimum when the population 
to beds ratio satisfies equation (1). If  M  and R  are both doubled, the mean 
length of  the patient queue falls,  and  the occupancy rate of  hospital beds 
rises.'O These economies of massed reserves generate a cost function that ex- 
hibits increasing returns; unit costs are inversely related to firm size. The cost 
advantage enjoyed by the largest store has to be set against any cost disadvan- 
tages incurred by customers who have to travel longer distances or who have 
to wait in longer customer lines. 
4.4  A Full-Price Model of Consumer Demand 
Goods are not acquired in continuous flows. They are purchased in discrete 
lots or batches. Time and resources are allocated to the complementary activ- 
ities of  buying, carting,  and storing consumable goods. The costs of  these 
activities are incurred by both the consumer and the retailer. In this section, 
attention is first directed to an  inventory model that determines the size of 
each transaction and hence trip frequency. Next, this model is extended to 
analyze how a customer chooses a store. Finally, I examine the way in which 
the full price is affected by selling efforts and search costs. 
4.4.1  An Inventory Model and the Optimum Basket Size 
Following T.  M. Whitin (1952), the total cost of  consuming Q units of a 
single good is the sum of  three components: (1) expenditures for the good, 
PQ; (2) shopping or setup costs, C, = ST, where S is the implicit cost of  a 
trip, and T is the trip frequency per month; and (3) home-inventory costs, C, 
= h - ,  where h is the unit cost of  holding a home inventory whose average  13 
size is - . When (is Q,  S, h)  are all exogenous, total cost is a function of only  13 
one decision variable, the basket or transaction size q. 
C  = C(q) = PQ  + C, + C,, = PQ + S-  + h-  (3  (3 
A larger basket reduces total cost if  it reduces C, by  more than it raises C,. 
The optimum basket size balances these two opposing effects and is attained 
when  -C,'  = CHI. 
(3)  q*  = 
10.  Consider a community with several hospitals. Patient amvals are proportional to bed ca- 
pacities. If the largest hospital has 60 percent of all beds in this community, it gets 60  percent of 
all patient arrivals. If all of the beds in a particular hospital are filled, the patient has to wait for a 
vacancy or balk and move to another hospital. The likelihood of this situation is inversely related 
to hospital size. The queuing model implies that the largest hospital realizes the highest bed oc- 
cupancy rate. This principle is equally applicable to airlines. George Douglas and James Miller 
(1974) found that on a given route,  the carrier supplying the largest number of available seats 
enjoyed the highest seat occupancy rate or load factor. 171  Productivity in Distributive Trades 
Substitute for q*  in c, and divide by Q to obtain the full price P*: 
(4)  P* = P + y  = P + g. 
The full price is the sum of the retail price P set by the store plus an implicit 
buyer cost y, which is incurred by  the shopper. Everyone who patronizes a 
given store pays the same price R but y can vary across customers resulting in 
a distribution of full prices. The implicit buyer cost is lower for those who 
confront lower cost parameters {S, h} and who demand larger total volumes 
per month  Q. The square-root formula assumes that {S,  h} are constants. 
Spoilage and limited storage capacity K‘ ought to produce a rising marginal 
holding cost function (MHC) like the curve depicted in figure 4.2.  The opti- 
mum for this case results in a smaller basket q**, which is to the left of q*. A 
bigger refrigerator and more cupboard space shifts the capacity constraint K’ 
to the right, meaning a larger basket q**  and fewer shopping trips per month. 
4.4.2  Location and Store Choice 
The implicit trip cost S depends on, among other things, the distance D 
between home and store. Assume that this relation is linear, S = so + s,D.  ‘I 
Each customer is presumed to choose that store that provides him or her with 
the lowest full price. Consider a set of consumers who reside along a line of 
length L connecting stores A and B. If  both stores charge the same price t 
store choice is determined by proximity. Store A captures everyone who re- 
sides to the left of the midpoint D,.  If store A cuts its price, some customers 
located to the right of D, find that they can obtain a lower full price by going 
to the more distant store A, even though this means a higher implicit buyer 
cost. Because the implicit buyer cost is an increasing function of the distance 
to store A, (dy,/dD,)  >  0, there is a critical distance D* at which the full price 
at store A is the same as that at store B. This critical watershed distance is 
located further from store A for those customers who demand more per month 
Q, face a lower unit inventory cost h,  or incur a lower incremental trip cost s,. 
If Q, >  Q2,  individual 1 may patronize the more distant store A; person 2 finds 
that for him or her, the full price is lower by  shopping at the closer store B. 
We  could thus observe two individuals who live across the street from one 
another but who choose to shop at different stores. The number No  who choose 
to shop at store A will depend on the size of the retail price saving (Pb -  P,) 
and the distribution of customers, g(Z), which is the frequency of customers 
who face a cost penalty of traveling to store A of Z = (y, -  yb).  It is obvious 
that Z is negative for everyone who lives to the left of the midpoint D,. The 
customer traffic attracted by store A is thus 
11.  The value of the shopper’s time, the basket size q, the number of checkout lanes, and the 
travel mode could all affect the shopping cost parameters. The fixed component, so, will be larger 
for those who demand larger baskets; the incremental cost per mile, s,, is lower for those who 
drive rather than  walk to  the store. Although S is specific to  the customer-store match, I  shall 
assume that the trip cost parameters are the same for a given customer. 172  Walter Y. Oi 
**  * 
qq 
Fig. 4.2  Optimum basket size 
The incremental traffic due to a price change on the part of  store A is simply 
the negative of the height of the frequency density evaluated at the size of the 
price saving, A = (Pb -  PJ;  that is, dN,/dP,  = -  g(A).’*  The profitability of 
price competition will be greater, the larger is the elasticity of N, with respect 
to Pa. 
4.4.3 
Isaac Ehrlich  and Lawrence  Fisher  (1982) developed  a similar model  in 
which the full price, P*  = P  + Vt, is the sum of the retail price P plus an 
implicit shopper cost that depends on the value of the shopper’s time,  and 
the time required to purchase one unit of the good, t. This unit time require- 
ment is inversely  related  to advertising A, in-store selling effort E, and the 
customer’s total purchase volume Q. If A and E  are aggregated into a compos- 
ite retail service input R,  and if Q is held constant, the time requirement func- 
tion simplifies to t  = t(R)  with t’(R) < 0. Ehrlich  and Fisher argue that, if 
retailing is competitive, customers must confront the same full price, P*, at 
all stores.I3 Stores can still compete by cutting prices or supplying more retail 
services  but  are  always  subject  to  the  constraint  that  P*  is  a constant.  If 
Retail Services and the Full Price 
12.  Total sales at store A depends on the conditional distribution of purchases Q given the size 
of the cost penalty 2. 
13. This differs from my model of spatially differentiated stores where it is only the marginal 
customer located at D*  in figure 4.3 who faces the same full prices at two competing stores. Those 
customers located nearer to a store enjoy an inframarginal rent. 173  Productivity in Distributive Trades 
-  Vt‘(R) >  P,, (where P, is the price of the retail service input R),  it pays to 
expand  services because part of  the added costs of  more  services  can  be 
passed on to customers via a higher price l?  In response to an exogenous rise 
in  stores will increase R by taking out more local ads that reduce customer 
search costs and supplying more in-store services that reduce the time needed 
to complete a shopping trip. Notice that in the Ehrlich-Fisher model the con- 
sumer is passive, but in an inventory model the shopper modifies his or her 
behavior to minimize  the sum of  shopping and inventory ~0sts.I~  In a com- 
plete model, the implicit buyer cost, 7,  is jointly determined by actions taken 
by both the customer and the retail firm. 
4.5  Pricing by a Monopolistically Competitive Store 
Each retail  firm with its unique  location has a limited amount of  market 
power. The sales realized by a store depends on the price it sets P, its service 
level R, and a vector of exogenous variables Z, whose elements describe the 
socioeconomic characteristics of  the neighborhood  constituting  its  market 
area as well as the prices and service levels of competing stores. A price cut 
can expand sales by increasing either the number of  customer transactions N 
or the average basket  size q. If  E is the price elasticity  of  the  firm’s  sales 
demand function, the store sets price P  so that the marginal revenue is equal 
to the full marginal cost (FMC) which is the sum of  (1) the wholesale cost P,; 
(2) the direct marginal  handling  or operating  cost C,;  and (3) the marginal 
transaction cost T~.  Is 
14.  The retailer is passive in the inventory model. The two models could be combined to allow 
for the joint minimization of the full price. The fixed component of my shopping-trip cost function 
could be expressed in a form analogous to Ehrlich and Fisher, namely, so = Vr,, where r,  is the 
time input needed to search for the right store and to assemble goods at the store. The customer 
decides on the basket size and the choice of  a store; the retail firm sets the price P and the service 
level R. 
15.  Profits for the retail firm are given by 
1~ = (P -  Pw)X -  C(X,  N) -  P,R 
Holding the service level R constant, the first-order condition for a maximum is 
(dddP)  = X  + (P -  PJX, -  C,Xp -  C,N,  = 0 
Divide by the demand response, (dX/dP) = X, < 0, and define the marginal transaction cost as 
follows: 
TN = cN(Np/xp), 
If a price cut attracts no new traffic, N, = 0 and hence T~ = 0. Alternatively, if the basket size is 
unaffected by a price reduction, 
‘TN = (cdq). 174  Walter Y. Oi 
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Fig. 4.3  Full price as a function of distance 
Although this expression assumes that the store handles only one product, it 
is useful because it directs attention to the concept of the FMC, which exhibits 
increasing returns. 
Nearly all stores handle a product line and have to set prices for many re- 
lated products. The pricing problem is formally identical to that analyzed by 
R. H. Coase (1946) and M. J. Bailey (1954). The utility of shopping at store 
A is reduced whenever the price of a product purchased in positive quantity is 
increased. A decrease in the price of  a good that makes up a larger share of 
the budget has a greater effect on utility  and thus attracts more customers, 
resulting in spillover demands for other goods in the product line. The markup 
of  price over FMC is likely to be smaller for goods that are traffic generators 
with spillover effects. 
C. Bliss (1988) treated the retail firm as a multiproduct  monopoly  whose 
market power is limited by  competition.  The optimal spread between  price 
and wholesale cost (operating costs were assumed to be fixed and invariant to 
sales volume) satisfies the Ramsey rule with smaller spreads for goods with 
more elastic demands. The surplus is just sufficient to cover the fixed operat- 
ing cost. The price elasticities that determine the Ramsey prices are obtained 
from an indirect utility function applicable to a representative consumer who 
engages in one-stop shopping. To the extent that the same product is sold in 
several shops (which violates the one-stop shopping assumption but squares 
with the real world where cigarettes,  shampoo, and aspirin can be purchased 
at a drugstore or supermarket),  the pertinent price elasticities must be taken 
from  the  residual  demand  function  facing  a  single  spatially  differentiated 
store. The store’s pricing problem is very different from that analyzed in the 
Bliss model. 
Setting prices for thousands of  items poses  a formidable problem.  Some 
supermarket managers  allegedly solve this problem by mimicking  the price 
structure of a dominant firm such as the great A&P. The price data collected 
by  Bob R. Holdren  (1960) roundly rejects this allegation.  For pricing pur- 175  Productivity in Distributive Trades 
poses, Holdren claims that goods are placed into four categories: (1) items 
with externally fixed prices because of  consignment selling or resale price 
maintenance; (2) goods whose prices are unnoticed; (3) goods with wide pric- 
ing latitudes because of ignorance, small budget shares, or diversity in prod- 
uct quality; and (4) highly competitive goods which make up his k class and 
whose prices are important in choosing a store.16  The goods in the k class are 
strong traffic generators with spillover externalities. This latter point is nicely 
illustrated by Holdren who wrote: “The low margin on cornmeal was a sur- 
prise to this writer, but according to the supermarket operators, people who 
buy  cornmeal, buy it relatively frequently and tend to be ‘careful shoppers’ 
and ‘big eaters’. Thus to attract and hold them, lowering the price of cornmeal 
is relatively efficacious” (p. 80). Location and distance pose a higher barrier 
to switching when consumers do not have cars. Additionally, price cuts yield 
greater returns when customers are like the cornmeal addicts who demand 
larger baskets on  each trip.  There is,  thus,  a strong interaction between a 
store’s pricing policy and the shopping behavior of consumers. 
4.6  Price Competition and the Concentration of Food Stores 
In 1940 there was one food store for every 78 households, but by 1980 each 
food store served, on average, 481 households. Expenditures for food per 
household (in constant dollars) increased by  38 percent, and cars per house- 
hold nearly doubled. The share of  sales captured by  chain stores rose from 
35.2 percent to 46.7 percent. Sales per store in constant dollars doubled in the 
decade of  the  1940s, doubled again in the 1950s, but remained stable from 
1960 to 1970; confer table 4.4. R. Parker (1986) estimated that the average of 
the four-firm concentration ratios for a sample of  196 cities increased from 
45.3 percent in 1954 to 65.8 percent in 1977. Data from the census of retail 
trade also conform this trend toward increasing concentration. Supermarkets 
with 50 or more employees accounted for 19.20 percent of  all food sales in 
1967, which increased to 45.67 percent in  1982. This pattern is also evident 
in  the employment data. The percentage of  industrywide employment rose 
from 19.8 percent to 40.4 percent. This section explores the reasons for these 
changes in average store size and market concentration. 
4.6.1  Scale Economies in Retailing 
The  empirical  studies  by  Hall,  Knapp,  and  Winsten  (1961),  Douglas 
(19621, and Bucklin (1972) revealed a positive relation between labor produc- 
16. The preferred store is the one that provides the customer with the highest utility that de- 
pends on the vector of full prices and full income. The prices of goods in the k class allegedly 
have a greater effect on utility and are hence more important in choosing a store. According to 
Holdren, goods in the k class possess the following characteristics: (1)  buyers are aware of the 
price; (2) price differences across stores are perceptible; (3) the good has a large budget share; (4) 
demand is predictable; (5)  demand is relatively inelastic; and (6) a price difference will not be 
confused with a quality difference. 176  Walter Y. Oi 
Table 4.4  Food Stores- Sales and Related Variables, 1940-1980 
1940  1950  1960  1970  1975  1980 
No. of  stores (in thousands):* 
Independent  405.0  375.0 
Chain  41.35  24.70 
Convenience  ...  t.. 
Total  446.35  400.70 
Sales (in millions of constant 1967 dollars):* 
Independent  16,563  22,752 
Chain  9,034  13,611 
Convenience  ...  ... 
Total  25,597  36,362 
Sales per store (in thousands of  constant 1967 dollars): 
Independent  41  61 
Chain  218  530 
Convenience  ...  ... 
Total  57  91 
No. of  households (in thou- 
No. of registered autos:? 
Privately owned (in 
thousands)  27,372  40,191 
Per household  0.78  0.94 
sands)  34,949  42,867 
Disposable income (in constant 1967 dollars):$ 
In billions of 1967 dollars  183.6  273.9 
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Sources: *Progressive Grocer (April 1983, 48, 66); tMVMA Facts and Figures; $Economic Report of 
the President (1986, table B.26). 
tivity and store size, a relation implying that there are increasing  returns to 
scale.  B. Nooteboom  (1983) assembled  data  for Dutch  supermarkets  with 
similar service levels in terms of the width of the product line, types of de- 
partments,  and annual store hours. He initially  assumed that the labor input 
measured in man-hours M was a linear function of  annual sales X. 
where p,  is the fixed labor input, and p, = (y, + y2) is the marginal labor 
requirement that is the sum of the labor time needed to handle another cus- 
tomer plus the time spent in stocking goods. Given a stochastic arrival rate of 
customers, the ratio of queuing to serving times is kept within narrow limits. 
Hence, y1 = g,/q  is a constant, where g, is the mean waiting time, and the 
basket size q is a proxy for the mean serving time.  Because X  = Nq, man- 
hours is a linear function of  the number of transactions or customer trips N 
and annual sales X. 177  Productivity in Distributive Trades 
Mi  = p,  + g,N, + y,X,  + ei. 
The fixed labor input Po  is responsible for the increasing returns. This linear 
labor requirements function implies that the scale economies with respect to 
the average basket size q are greater than those with respect to the number of 
transactions N.” Other inputs such as floor space, equipment, parking, utili- 
ties, and advertising appear to be related to N and X in a similar manner. 
Increasing returns are evident in the U.S. data for food stores, which are 
shown in table 4.5.  Labor productivity measured by  sales per employee hour 
(XlH) is higher in  larger supermarkets where size is determined by  selling 
area. The effect of  size is somewhat weaker for chain stores. Average trans- 
action size, inventory turns, and the capital utilization rate measured by store 
hours are all positively related to store size. A given relative increase in sales 
volume X  or in the number of weekly transactions N is accompanied by a less 
than  proportionate  increase  in  operating costs.  Supermarkets that  achieve 
larger size thus enjoy lower unit operating costs. 
4.6.2 
According to D. Appel (1972), the supermarket was the institutional inno- 
vation that was responsible for the increased efficiency of  food distribution. 
The idea for a self-service, cash-and-carry store was evidently conceived in 
1916 when Charles Saunders opened his Piggly Wiggly store in Memphis. 
The supermarket movement in the east was launched by Michael Cullen who 
opened his King Kong store at Jamaica, New York, in  1930 and the Big Bear 
in Elizabeth, New Jersey. These stores followed the Piggly Wiggly model. By 
locating outside of  densely populated areas,  they  could  obtain low  rents, 
which enabled them to acquire large selling areas and parking space. Large 
sales  volumes  were  generated  by  cutting  prices  of  nationally  advertised 
brands, and customers were attracted by  heavy local advertising. The super- 
market offered low prices, but it eliminated free delivery and credit. All trans- 
actions were on a cash-and-carry basis. Part of the store’s responsibility for 
assuring product quality was shifted to the manufacturers of branded goods.  Is 
The success of a low-price strategy obviously depends on high-price elastici- 
ties of demand. 
The emergence of  price competition in the  1930s can be explained by  a 
model in which stores compete for customers who reside on a line connecting 
them. Customers who shop at store A realize a lower full price, P*, < P*, 
Implicit Shopper Costs and Price Competition 
17. Let 6M = (dM/M)  denote a logarithmic derivative. The linear function implies that 0 < 
(GMISq) < (6M/6N)  < 1. D. Schwartzman (1968) recognized this fact and argued that much of 
the upward trend in labor productivity (through 1963) could be explained by the growth in the 
average size of transactions. 
18. The rapid growth of trademarks in the 1970s has accelerated this shift; confer Landes and 
Posner (1983) and Pashigian and Bowen (1989).  The historical development of the supermarket 
is more fully discussed by Appel(1972,42-44) and by Blozan (1986, 16). 178  Walter Y. Oi 
Table 4.5  Selected Statistics for Supermarkets by Size and Ownership, 1988 
Independents  Chains 
10-15  20-25  35 +  10-15  20-25  35+  Item 
Weekly sales ($) 
Sales per employee 





Inventory value (in thou- 
sands of dollars) 
Weekly transactions 






Store hours (mean) 




























































































Source: Progressive Grocer, selected annual statistical supplements. 
Note: Store size is measured in thousands of square feet of selling area. 
meaning that the implicit shopping cost penalty is less than the price differen- 
tial; that is, they satisfy the inequality, 
Let S = so + s,D = V(t, + t,D)  denote the implicit cost of a shopping trip, 
where V is the value of the shopper’s time, to is the time spent at the store, and 
t,D is the time required to travel to and from the store. Recall that D  is the 
distance to store A;  (L -  D)  is the distance to B.  The cost penalty of shopping 
at A is thus given by, 
where 
Equation (7) describes a nonlinear transformation  from D to Z, which de- 
pends on the parameter vector {k, to,  t,}.  If N consumers with the same value 
of k are uniformly distributed along the line, thenf(D)  = NIL, but their distri- 
bution as a function of the cost penalty Z is described by a dome-shaped curve 179  Productivity in Distributive Trades 
like g(Z) shown in figure 4.4.  The maximum cost penalty of traveling to store 
A is incurred by the person residing next to store B: 
(9)  = Z(L) = k[VqTq  - fil.  Zm,, 
Because Z  is negative for those living to the left of the midpoint Dm,  g(Z) is 
symmetrical with a mode at Z = 0 and a lower bound of Z(0) = -Z(L). The 
traffic attracted by a price cut on the part of store A depends on the height of 
the frequency distribution evaluated at the size of the price differential,  dNJ 
dP,)  =  -g(A). Appel identified three factors that raised the price elasticity 
of demand and hence increased the returns to price cutting: First, the migra- 
tion from rural to urban places resulted in higher population densities, which 
translate into proportional upward shifts in go.  Second, rising real incomes 
and larger families increased the demand for food. A higher demand Q re- 
duces k, which pulls in the bounds, -  Z(L) <  Z < + Z(L)  of g(Z). If A’s price 
advantage remains  constant, more customers will shift to A  unambiguously 
increasing its sales, X,. Although the high-price store B  loses customers due 
to a rise in Q,  the net effect on its sales is indeterminate.lg Third, higher car 
ownership rates lower the cost of going to more distant stores. As f, falls, the 
bounds for g(Z) again move in toward the origin. In the limit as t, approaches 
zero, g(a degenerates to a spike at Z  = 0, and any price reduction below the 
competing store means that the price-cutter captures the entire contested mar- 
ket. Some high-priced stores disappear, and the market areas of the remaining 
stores expand. 
In addition to urbanization,  higher incomes,  and car ownership rates, the 
returns to price competition  were affected by home inventory costs and the 
value of time.  A decrease in unit home-inventory costs h reduces k thereby 
increasing the demand facing the low-price store A. However, a higher value 
of time raises the costs of shopping at both stores. Because (dkldv) >  0, a rise 
in V flattens g(Z) and hence reduces N,. In an inventory model, a higher cost 
of time discourages price competition, but this model ignores other responses 
available to consumers and retailers. A store could broaden its product line so 
that a shopper can economize on shopping time by purchasing  food, drugs, 
and  sundries at one place.  These responses  are examined in  section 4.7.3, 
below. 
To  sum  up,  food  stores  and  nearly  all  retail  establishments  are  getting 
larger.  Reference  to table  4.6 reveals that,  aside from apparel and eating/ 
drinking places, we have experienced an absolute decline in the number of 
retail establishments in every two-digit industry. The decline has taken place 
in the smaller employment size classes. The number of large retail establish- 
ments with 20 or more employees has increased  in every two-digit industry. 
19.  If the elasticity of N, with respect to Q lies in the interval, -  1 <  (SNJSQ) <  0, an increase 
in  demand per household Q will lead to larger sales, X, = N,Q. The loss of  customers is more 
than offset by higher demands on the part of the remaining customers. 180  Walter Y.  Oi 
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Fig. 4.4  Distribution of customers by implicit cost penalty 
Technological advances outside of the distribution sector are mainly respon- 
sible for these trends. The relative prices of cars, refrigerators, and advertising 
messages have declined. Consumers are prepared to incur higher implicit cost 
penalties to patronize stores that offer lower prices. By cutting prices and al- 
tering the service mix, supermarkets have succeeded in attracting more cus- 
tomers and generating larger sales volumes that can be supplied at lower unit 
costs because of the economies of large scale and of  massed reserves. These 
developments were responsible for the  improvements in  labor productivity 
that were observed through the mid-1970s. 
4.7  On the Organization of Production and the Product Line 
The comer grocer and the giant super belong to the same three-digit indus- 
try,  SIC 541, but they differ in important respects that affect the relation of 
outputs to inputs. Attention is directed here to three aspects of this diversity. 
First, the capital to labor ratio and the rate of  capital utilization surely affect 
labor productivity. Second, the composition of the retail work force has been 
influenced by the reallocation of distributive functions among the three partic- 
ipants-manufacturers,  retailers, and consumers. Finally, I explore the rea- 
sons for changes in the output mix over time, and the effect of these changes 
on labor productivity. 
4.7.1 
The measurement of the capital to labor ratio is confounded by  variations 
in  the output mix  and the quality of  capital. The ratio of  the book value of 
assets to employment is higher for larger supers, but selling areas and inven- 
tories per full-time equivalent employee are lower. Larger supers are more 
likely to have delicatessens, bakeries, and fresh fish, which call for less floor 
space but more capital equipment. Buildings and equipment are newer in big- 
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Table 4.6  Number of Retail Establishments and Consuming Units, 
1963and1982 
No. of  Establishments 
Industry  1963  1982  198211963 
No. of consuming units (millions): 
Families  47.5 
Households  55.2 
Population, total  189.2 
Population, 20 and older  115.3 
Retail trade, total  1,532,291 
Building Materials (52)  87,499 
General Merchandise (53)  58,264 
Food stores (54)  289,073 
Auto dealers (55x)  89,651 
Gas stations (554)  180,879 
Apparel (56)  109,392 
Furniture (57)  86,832 
Eatingldrinking  (58)  288,384 
Drugstores (591)  52,063 
Other (59x)  224,396 
Groceries (541)  222,442 
Establishments operated entire year (SIC code): 
Selected 3-digit industries: 
Meat (542)  14,910 
Retail bakeries (546)  16,935 
Liquor stores (592)  37,093 
Retail trade, total  70,000 
Building materials (52)  2,475 
General merchandise (53)  10,383 
Food stores (54)  16,644 
Auto dealers (55x)  10,193 
Gas stations (554)  514 
Apparel (56)  5,058 
Furniture (57)  2,059 
Eating/drinking (58)  15,784 
Drugstores (591)  2,702 
Other (59x)  2,450 
Groceries (541)  15,874 
Meat (542)  67 
Liquor stores (592)  108 
Large establishments  with 20 or more employees (SIC code): 
Selected 3-digit industries: 
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ger stores that make more use of scanners.*O  Inventory turnover rates are pos- 
itively  related  to size resulting  in  a  lower inventory  to labor ratio  in large 
supers. If  we adjust for differences in the output mix and equipment quality, 
the ratio of capital to labor is positively related to firm size. 
The fixed overhead costs of capital account for a larger share of  total costs 
in larger firms,  which thus have a stronger incentive to utilize capital more 
intensively by operating more shifts in manufacturing or establishing longer 
store hours in retailing.  In 1988, the largest supers were open for an average 
of  138 hours a week, and half of them were always open. The small indepen- 
dents reported an average of  96 hours a week, and only 7 percent were open 
24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Size had a weaker effect on store hours for 
chain stores. The outlets in a given chain evidently adopt similar operating 
practices, including  store hours.  Over the  last  two decades, average  store 
hours have  steadily increased-possibly  a response  to a rise in the ratio of 
fixed to total  costs or to an increase in consumer demands for longer store 
hours.2i It could be argued that an expansion  of store hours could induce a 
reduction in the price-cost margin if weekday and Sunday sales are viewed as 
related services. Alternatively,  if sales volumes and store hours are positively 
related, the economies of  scale could explain the decline in price-cost mar- 
gins. Increases in the capital to labor ratio and longer store hours both contrib- 
ute to improvements in labor productivity measured by the sales to employee 
hours ratio. 
4.7.2 
In  1950, one could  still be  served  by  a retail  clerk  or butcher,  but  self- 
service is now the rule, even at convenience  stores. Cashiers make change, 
and stock clerks replenish  shelves. We  have to punch a computer to find the 
dog food. National advertising and brand names have replaced trained clerks 
who used  to inform  us about products.  Store-specific human  capital  might 
have been a valuable asset when customers asked for particular clerks whose 
advice was sought and who would honor implicit warranties in the event that 
we got a defective or spoiled product. When transactions become impersonal 
and standardized, there is less to be gained by establishing durable, ongoing 
relations between customers and clerks who know one another. Barry Blue- 
Standardization and the Skill Mix of  the Retail Work Force 
20.  Nearly all of the giant supermarkets defined as those with  35,000  or more square feet of 
selling area were using scanners in  1986, but only around a third of the small supers with selling 
areas of  10,000-15,000 square feet had acquired this technology; see Progressive  Grocer, pt. 2 
(April 1987, 22). In 1981, the average age of the buildings owned by  giant supers was 9.8 years 
compared to 16.6  years for small supers; see Progressive Grocer (April 1982,23). The percentage 
of capital equipment acquired in the used market was inversely related to firm size for Japanese 
manufacturing firms; see Oi (1983). 
21.  Pashigian and Bowen (1989) favor the latter explanation. They find that trademarks and 
store hours are positively related to female wages but unrelated to male wages. A higher labor 
force participation rate and a high opportunity cost of female time are, in their view, responsible 
for longer store hours. 183  Productivity in Distributive Trades 
stone (1981) concluded that we have witnessed a retail revolution. Retail ser- 
vices have become impersonal resulting in a deskilling of the work force. 
The reliance on part-timers is one indicator of the skill mix. In  1975, full- 
time employees outnumbered part-time workers in the supermarkets that re- 
sponded to the Progressive Grocer survey, but by  1988, they made up only 41 
percent of  all employees at independent supers and 36 percent at the chains. 
The ratio of  part-time to full-time employees (PT/FT)  is positively related to 
size and rose from 1.04 in  1981 to  1.79 in  1988: see table 4.7. Part of  the 
secular trend is due to a shift toward larger supermarkets. Even if size is held 
constant, the ratio exhibits a positive trend. By  1988, 70.3 percent and 64.8 
percent of  all employees at the giant independents and chains were on part- 
time work  schedules. If  the production function was  homothetic, the larger 
supers should have faced a lower relative wage for part-time employees. The 
wage ratios shown in table 4.8 exhibit a contrary pattern, being somewhat 
higher at larger stores. The elasticity of hourly wages with respect to sales was 
+ .081 and + .079 for part and full-time clerks.22  Larger supermarkets have 
to pay higher wages because their employees have to supply more work effort. 
The wages reflect the effect of  higher customer-arrival rates on labor produc- 
tivity.  More clerks have to be  hired  at the bigger supers, and the queuing 
model predicts that these employees are more productive because a smaller 
fraction of labor time is wasted in idly waiting for customers. More productive 
employees do indeed command higher wages, and the data indicate that the 
productivity gains associated with weekly sales volume are relatively greater 
for part-time employees. In addition to this relation with weekly sales, labor 
productivity is positively related to sales fluctuations over the diurnal and day- 
of-the-week cycles. Some 55 percent of all supermarket shopping trips and 60 
percent of trips made by employed persons take place in the three days, from 
Thursday to Saturday. Unemployed individuals make few shopping trips on 
Sundays. The diurnal cycle of  customer arrivals varies with the day of  the 
week  and  shopper characteristics.  Nonworking mothers prefer  to  shop on 
weekday mornings; Friday evenings are popular for working individuals.  23 
Part-time employees are analogous to the standby generators that are activated 
only during the peak load period. The higher is the fraction of  total demand 
produced during the peak period; the larger is the ratio of  standby to fully 
utilized on-line generators that are operated in both peak and off-peak periods. 
Although we cannot cleanly identify the peak and off-peak hours at a super- 
22.  The log of the hourly wage was regressed on the log of weekly sales for the eight observa- 
tions in  1984 and 1985. These elasticities imply that a fivefold increase in sales volume (roughly 
the  differential between the  giant and small supers) would be  accompanied by  a 13.9 percent 
higher wage for a part-time clerk and 13.6  percent for a full-time  clerk. The wage-sales  elasticities 
for the chain stores were  +  .I61 and  + .I10 for part- and full-time clerks. The wage premiums 
associated with a fivefold increase in  sales were 29.5 and  19.5 percent for part- and  full-time 
clerks. These results are consistent with the firm-size effect on wages, which were reported by 
Lester(1967), Mellow(1981), Oi (1983), andBrownandMedoff (1989). 
23. These data are reported in Progressive Grocer (April 1989,42). 184  Walter Y. Oi 
Table 4.7  Ratio of Part-Time to Full-Time Employees by Store Size, 1981-1988 
All 

















1.04  1.12  1.20  1.14  ... 
1.11  1.03  1.15  1.21  1 .oo 
1.13  1.27  1.38  1.36  1.27 
1.23  1.24  1.22  1.38  1.22 
1.22  1.32  1.40  1.58  1.96 
1.17  1.41  1.49  1.29  2.09 
1.31  1.42  1.49  1.34  1.70 
1.17  1.26  1.33  1.33  1.54 
...  ... 
1.11  1.06 
1.43  1.17 
1.82  1.23 
2.26  1.33 
1.78  1.36 
2.36  1.43 
1.79  1.26 
Table 4.8  Hourly Wages of Part-Time and Full-Time Clerks: 1985 
Sales Volume  Ratio, Part-Time/ 
(in millions of dollars)  Part-Time Clerks  Full-Time Clerks  Full-Time 
Independents: 
2-4  $3.98  $4.84  0.822 
4-8  $4.31  $5.11  0.843 
8-12  $4.64  $5.35  0.867 
> 12  $4.71  $5.63  0.837 
Average  $4.18  $5.01  0.834 
2-4  $4.15  $5.45  0.761 
4-8  $5.07  $6.23  0.814 
8-12  $5.49  $6.45  0.851 
> 12  $5.72  $6.69  0.855 
Average  $5.10  $6.23  0.819 
Log sales X*  0.0810  0.0791  0.0019 
1985 dummy  0.0150  -0.0136  0.0286 
R2  0.8976  0.9778  0.4059 
log sales X*  0.  I605  0,1099  0.0506 
1985 dummy  -  0.0594  -0.0196  -0.0398 
R2  0.8347  0.8486  0.7576 
Chains: 
Regression of log wage on /a: 
Regression of log wage on /a: 
Nore: Let Yp, = the log of the hourly wage of part-time clerks, Y, = the log of the hourly wage 
of  full-time clerks, and R  = (Y, - Y,,)  denote the log of  the wage ratio that is equal to the 
difference in logs. I estimated three equations: 
Yp, = a, + b,X* + c,D + el 
Y,,  a,  + bzX* + c,D  + e, 
R  = a, + b,X*  + c,D  + e, 
where X* is the logarithm of  weekly sales, and D is a dummy variable equal to unity for the 1985 
observations. Only the b, and c, parameter estimates are reported. We  have the identities, b, = 
(b, - b,) and c, = (c, - c2). The coefficient of determination for the third regression is not 
equal to the difference in R’  for the other two columns. 185  Productivity in Distributive Trades 
market,  two generalizations  seem to be  warranted:  First, working  persons 
tend to shop on Friday evenings and weekends, which are usually the heavy 
peak hours. A rising labor force participation rate should have increased the 
ratio of sales in the high peak hours to sales in the low off-peak hours (XJXL). 
Second,  working  individuals  are more likely  to shop at  the larger  supers 
whose longer store hours reduce their implicit shopping costs. The analogy to 
the generation  of electric power  implies that a rise in (XJXL) increases the 
ratio of part to full-time employees (PT/FT).  The available evidence suggests 
that the ratio of peak to off-peak sales (XJXJ is positively related to store size 
and has increased over time in response to the increase in labor force partici- 
pation rates. This increase in the within-week variability of  food sales is re- 
sponsible  for part  of  the upward  trend in the relative demand for part-time 
employees. 
Retail trade which once provided full-time, stable jobs for most of its em- 
ployees has become an industry characterized  by low wages and high labor 
turnover  rates.  The introduction  of  scanners, organizational  innovations  in 
monitoring and warehousing, and the substitution of advertising for point-of- 
sale services  have  reduced  the relative  demand for stable,  full-time, store- 
specific workers.  But this is only part of  the story. Shifts by consumers in the 
allocation of time to market and nonmarket activities and changes in shopping 
patterns  have  affected  the derived demands for full-time  and part-time em- 
ployees.  The productivity  of  part-time  workers  with  little training  has  in- 
creased in relation to the productivity of full-timers. In order to survive, su- 
permarkets have been obliged to alter the skill mix of  the work force and the 
bundle of services which they provide to customers. 
4.7.3  The Product Line and Labor Productivity 
The supermarket consolidated the  sales of  groceries, meat,  and produce 
under one roof. As the size of the establishment grew, it expanded the product 
line. It handled more brands of breakfast cereals and introduced new depart- 
ments-bakeries,  delicatessens, fresh fish, drugs, hardware, fresh flowers, 
video rentals, and so on. The size distribution of establishments has shifted to 
the right in nearly all of  the two-digit retail trade industries; see table 4.6. In 
most instances, the pattern is similar to that in groceries; growth is accompa- 
nied by an expansion in the breadth of  the product line. However,  in a few 
cases, such as gasoline service stations, outlets have narrowed their product 
lines as they got larger. What are the reasons for these divergent trends? How 
do changes in the breadth of the product line affect productivity? 
The implicit cost of  a trip to a supermarket is a common cost for all the 
items in the basket. It is akin to the capital cost in the peak load pricing prob- 
lem. The trip frequency that minimizes  the sum of  trip and home-inventory 
costs is determined by certain critical items just as the capital capacity is de- 
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kins has no effect on the optimum number of shopping trips per  If 
the marginal trip cost is zero for most items, the supermarket would seem to 
have an advantage over specialty shops. Inventory costs and floor space place 
limits on the breadth of the product line. A typical supermarket in 1960 did 
not  sell fresh salmon, presumably  because  it could  not  supply it at a suffi- 
ciently low full price. If the arrival rate of calls for fresh salmon was small, 
inventory  and handling costs would have  sharply  increased  the break-even 
price. As consumer demands climbed and selling areas expanded, the super- 
market could supply  salmon at a full price (adjusted for quality and a zero 
marginal trip cost), below that of a specialty fish market. Rising real incomes 
expand the range of items that are demanded in sufficient volumes to warrant 
the inventory and handling  costs. The economies of  one-stop shopping may 
prompt  a consumer to buy his or her chocolates  and fresh fish at the same 
store.25  The product line has moved in the opposite direction in SIC 554, gaso- 
line service stations. In the early 1970s, three-fourths of  all stations had ser- 
vice bays for repairs and oil changes compared to fewer than half today. The 
use of self-service pumps increased from 31 percent of  all motorists in 1976 
to 78 percent in 1986. Stations are larger and more specialized. They are earn- 
ing more revenues from pumping gas and fewer from repairs, lube jobs, and 
sales of  tires, batteries, and accessories.26  From the viewpoint of  shopping 
trip costs, gasoline and lube jobs are not like soap and bagels. They are more 
like dry cleaning and haircuts. An optimum trip frequency is not determined 
by an inventory  model.  Shopping times are additive and do not exhibit the 
increasing returns applicable to acquiring more items at a supermarket.  De- 
sign changes have lengthened the interval between filling tanks and changing 
oil. Nonprice competition and warranties have shifted part of the repair busi- 
ness to auto dealers. As the arrival rates  for repairs and lube jobs fell,  gas 
stations experienced a fall in the utilization rate of  mechanics. Those stations 
that eliminated service bays found that the mechanics who previously pumped 
gas and repaired cars could be replaced by less skilled employees. Fewer sta- 
tions offered a full product line (gas and repairs), and roughly half of all driv- 
ers chose to produce oil changes at home. In the  1980s, specialists emerged. 
24.  In the model analyzed by P.  0.  Steiner (1957), the case of a firm peak meant that there was 
excess capacity in the low, off-peak period. Optimum prices in peak and off-peak periods are P, 
= (a  + p) and P, = a,  where a  is the unit operating cost and p is the unit capital cost. Capital 
is a common input for both periods.  Variations in the off-peak demand for electricity have no 
effect on the choice of the capital input unless the demands in both periods are equal to the capital 
capacity. 
25.  If the item is a delicacy that is infrequently purchased, the customer may prefer to go to a 
specialty shop where the expected full price (possibly including a component for assurance of 
quality),  is lower than that at a supermarket.  Stand-alone retail bakeries and delicatessens have 
declined as a consequence of  a rising implicit cost of a shopper’s time. 
26.  There were 426 cars per station in  1972 and 1,129 in  1986. The figures on average estab- 
lishment size measured by gallons sold per month are a bit misleading because gasoline sales at 
convenience stores, whose market share is climbing, are excluded from SIC 554. The data re- 
ported in this section were obtained from chap. 3 of  the study sponsored by the American Petro- 
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Franchise dealers found that they could attract enough arrivals to supply lube 
jobs at a full price below that attainable via home production. A division of 
labor was thus achieved by  self-service stations and Jiffy Lube dealers who 
separately pumped gas and changed oil. 
Variations in the output mix and tied services complicate the problem of 
measuring productivity. In  the case of  retailing, Robert Steiner (1978) pro- 
posed a vertical measure of productivity wherein inputs at both the manufac- 
turing and retailing levels are aggregated and compared to final outputs at the 
retail level. This principle can obviously be extended to include the inputs 
supplied by consumers. A gas station that introduces self-service is substitut- 
ing the labor services of the customer for hired labor. The consequence is an 
increase in the BLS measure of labor productivity. The annual growth rates of 
sales per employee hour reported in table 4.3 were 4.0 percent for gas stations 
and 0.7 percent for food stores. For stations of  comparable size, the output 
per gas pump is higher at self-service stations. When the customer supplies 
the labor input, it takes less time to complete a transaction-filling  the tank 
and paying the cashier.  *’  The adoption of  self-service has clearly led to real 
efficiency gains. 
The difference in the rates of technical progress in distributing gasoline ver- 
sus food can, in part,  be explained by  the fact that supermarkets have  ex- 
panded their product lines and introduced new departments that call for larger 
inputs of labor per dollar of sales. In the context of the Becker (1965) model, 
the substitution of prepared baked goods for homemade cakes can be inter- 
preted as the outcome of a search for the lowest  full price. It is the obverse of 
the self-service gas station. The product in the vertical measure proposed by 
Robert Steiner is a cheesecake on a plate or gasoline in the tank. The inputs 
supplied by both retailer and consumer have to be related to these final prod- 
ucts in  calculating full prices and  in determining labor or TFP.  Fewer re- 
sources are needed to transform the ingredients into a cake at a supermarket 
bakery, but the costs of  moving this cake onto a dinner plate are higher. The 
costs of acquiring a prepared cake or salad are higher than the costs of  buying 
packages of flour and cream cheese. A rise in the implicit cost of home labor 
increases the relative full price of  a homemade cake, where the full price is 
the sum of the transformation and transaction costs. 
The rate of technical progress for a multiproduct firm as we ordinarily mea- 
sure it is a weighted average of the rates of technical progress for the compo- 
nent goods in the firm’s product line. Supermarkets in pursuit of higher profits 
have broadened their product lines into more labor-intensive departments with 
slower rates of productivity growth. Increases in the implicit costs of shopping 
27.  A correct production  function has to  include the  input of  the customer’s time.  In  New 
Jersey and Oregon where self-service is illegal, the customer’s time input entails an implicit cost 
of waiting while he or she receives full service. In the majority of transactions, the customer incurs 
the implicit cost of pumping one’s own gasoline, which is probably quite low except in adverse 
weather. I wish to  thank  Dr.  T.  F. Hogarty of  the American Petroleum Institute for discussions 
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and of  household  labor have enhanced  the economies of one-stop shopping 
and  increased  the demands for prepared  foods. These developments  are re- 
sponsible for the decline in sales per employee hour at food stores that took 
place in the mid-1970s. Gas stations, on the other hand, are allocating a larger 
fraction of resources into transferring  goods (pumping gas), and moving out 
of the labor-intensive activities of auto repairs and servicing. Consumers are 
obtaining  the distribution  of  gasoline  and  the production  of  repair  services 
more cheaply by  a division  of  labor between  specialized  institutions,  even 
when we include the implicit costs of labor provided by customers. 
4.8  Concluding Remarks 
A production  function that relates output to inputs lies at the heart of the 
received theory  of productivity  change, which is summarized  by Jorgenson 
(1987) and Griliches (1987). In applying this theory to the distributive trades, 
one has to recognize at least three differences: First, the consumer supplies an 
essential input which has to be included as an explicit argument of the produc- 
tion function. Ignoring this fact constitutes a specification error that could bias 
the measured rate of growth in productivity.  Second, producing transactions 
is similar to repairing machines.  Both are characterized by the economies of 
massed reserves wherein a twofold increase in both the customer-arrival rate 
and the number of clerks leads to more than a twofold increase in the number 
of completed transactions.  If the frictions resulting from transport and home- 
inventory costs can be reduced by technical advances outside of  the distribu- 
tion sector, retail firms can achieve larger sizes with their lower unit operating 
costs. Third, the output of a retail firm is a composite bundle whose compo- 
sition varies across firms and over time. The relation between an aggregate 
measure  of  output  (such as sales or value  added) and purchased  inputs de- 
pends on the makeup of this bundle. The output of a supermarket has changed 
over time, moving toward more embodied labor services in the goods that they 
handle. 
Progress  in  the goods-producing  industries  is  frequently  associated  with 
technological innovations.  The development of the mechanical cotton picker, 
of  the cranberry paddler, and of the chain saw was responsible for increases 
in TFP. However, institutional and organizational innovations as well as reg- 
ulatory changes can have equally strong effects. The tax on chain stores, ana- 
lyzed by Tom Ross (1986), impeded the spread of  an important institutional 
innovation called the supermarket, which brought together the sales of grocer- 
ies, meat,  and produce under one roof. It  mimicked  the department store, 
which assembled a wide  variety  of  goods and provided  customers with the 
economy of one-stop shopping, trained clerks, and a reputation for stocking 
quality goods. The reputational value of the department store has been eroded 
by nationally  advertised  branded  goods and specialty franchises that shifted 
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ufacturer.  Steiner contends that the fall in the gross margin on toys from 40 
percent to 20 percent  was largely due to national advertising and mass mer- 
chandising  by  discount  outlets.28  The establishment  of  shopping  malls  has 
reduced the value of  one firm handling a wide variety of goods. The viability 
of the traditional  department store is threatened  by the shopping mall, spe- 
cialty franchises, and national advertising. I fully expect to observe a leftward 
shift  in  the  size distribution  of  general  merchandise,  apparel,  and  variety 
stores. 
Gasoline service stations are, on average, smaller in those states that have 
divorcement laws preventing refiners from establishing dual distribution sys- 
tems. The legislated inefficiency is reflected in higher retail prices and lower 
labor producti~ity.~~  If these divorcement laws were repealed, the rise in labor 
productivity could be confused with technical progress rather than to the elim- 
ination of a regulatory constraint. 
The allocation of productive and distributive functions among the manufac- 
turer,  retailer,  and consumer raises questions about the  merits of  trying  to 
measure productivity at each level. There are compelling reasons to argue for 
a measure of  final outputs-a  cake on a dinner plate or gas in the tank. The 
division of labor is surely determined by comparative advantage. Technologi- 
cal innovations and changes in factor prices can alter the optimal allocation of 
resources across sectors. These reallocations are often endogenous and should 
be incorporated  in an overall measure of technical progress in the combined 
production and distribution of ultimate consumer goods. 
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Comment  Sherwin Rosen 
The empirical economist Colin Clark was among the first to track how the 
share of service-sector employment and output expand as economies grow and 
develop.  Yet economists, by and large, have ignored services.  Not  only is 
there a remarkably small literature on the positive aspects of  their analysis, 
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but the accounting expedient of  measuring output by  inputs hardly has been 
addressed. The wealthier we become, the more we are doomed to suffer the 
sham of  smaller measured productivity  growth  compared  to more  goods- 
intensive economies-this,  in spite of the obvious and important innovations 
in service sector technology and economic organization that continue to occur 
over time. Walter Y.  Oi’s paper outlines a systematic way of thinking about 
the economics of services that is essential to research in this field. He presents 
a superb minicourse on the economics of retail trade. The essential element of 
the  models reviewed  is that  distributional  services are jointly  produced  by 
stores and customers. The economics of  the retail  service sector cannot be 
understood without recognizing that shoppers’ time is a key input in the pro- 
duction of distributional services. 
This point is established in the model showing how a customer divides an- 
nual purchases into basket sizes and number of trips to the store. The solution 
balances  the  costs  of  an  additional  trip  against  the  incremental  home- 
inventory costs of goods. By analogy to the economics of  the household, Oi 
shows that the full price of an item is its retail price plus a term that reflects 
the consumer’s time and money costs of  shopping, and the cost of  holding 
goods at home rather than in the store. An extension allows retailing services 
to be produced more intensively by varying advertising and brand recognition 
embodied in goods and salespersons’ efforts to provide customer services as 
substitutes for customers’ time and effort. 
The economies of scale implicit in inventory holdings are bounded by spa- 
tial monopolistic competition among retail establishments. Nevertheless, they 
imply  systematic  changes  in  distributional  service  productivity  as  these 
bounds  are changed over time.  The full-price  formula organizes  these ele- 
ments as consisting of changes in the value of time, transportation costs, resi- 
dential density, urbanization,  and inventory holding costs. I would emphasize 
the changing composition of  families in this, particularly the increasing labor 
force participation of  women. The substitution of market for home production 
and the resulting increase in the value of women’s time has markedly changed 
the production of retail services. 
The paper stresses an unfamiliar “economy of  massed reserves,” as the key 
ingredient in retailing.  This concept comes from queueing theory, where it is 
shown that an increase in the number of clerks and customers, although hold- 
ing their ratio constant, reduces queueing time in a multi-server facility. Yet 
that experiment is partial equilibrium because a customer would consider ex- 
pected crowding and queue length in choosing a store: those things are another 
aspect of  price. The equalization of  full prices  at the  margin  would  cause 
queue lengths to adjust to use up any economies of massed reserves in a mar- 
ket  equilibrium. In any event  Rothschild, Arrow,  Levhari  and others  have 
shown that these economies are not very large to begin with. 
It is the simpler point that there are scale economies of  inventory holdings 
that are key to understanding this sector. A store and  its sales force are an 
inventory  of  goods waiting  for customers. One can think of  alternative ar- 193  Productivity in Distributive Trades 
rangements in  which  customers wait  for goods rather  than  the  other  way 
around. Ready examples are the queues for consumer goods observed in the 
former Soviet Union. A more interesting example for measurement is how to 
treat  store hours. When gasoline service stations were open for only a few 
hours  per  day  during the  energy crisis  in  the  1970s,  long  lines  of  autos 
queueing for service were substituted for the waiting services of station oper- 
ators and their employees. Measured productivity of  service stations would 
have registered enormous gains over that period, in spite of the fact that the 
amount of services rendered  fell dramatically.  Only a scheme in which cus- 
tomer queueing time is subtracted from the value of output would recognize 
this point. Similarly, increased grocery and convenience store hours in recent 
years  results  in  a drop in measured  productivity,  though the change in  the 
value  of  customers’  time  and  consumption  patterns  that  provoked  these 
changes no doubt has increased true productivity. 
Services in general are subject to the problem that as the wage rate increases 
with economic growth the provision of  service-intensive distribution becomes 
very expensive. This causes substitution to less service-intensive methods at 
the distribution  point,  such  as self-service, and to  more  service-intensive 
methods at the production  point, such as advertising and packaging.  To  that 
extent what we observe is a movement along some grand production function 
that should not be confused with productivity change. But to some other ex- 
tent these observed substitutions  are due to technical changes that should be 
properly counted as productivity improvements. For instance, the rising price 
of women’s time and the smaller size of  families increased the extent of pre- 
paredness in grocery stores, which range from old-fashioned raw ingredients 
for home-cooked  meals to frozen, precooked  items and to completely  pre- 
pared gourmet meals. Microwave technology  and the like are important  in 
this.  The paper stops short of discussing how to parcel these things out be- 
tween productivity  and (full-) price adjustments.  Only a little thought is re- 
quired to show that this will be a very hard problem to solve. 
How should the increasing range of goods available through the distribution 
system be treated in all of this? Should the presence of kiwifruit and plantains 
in grocery stores today be attributed to improvements in food production or to 
improvements  in retail services? How about the Colombian cut-flower busi- 
ness or the availability of Chilean fresh fruit and strawberries in the winter 
months? Do these  things  get counted as productivity  improvements  in  the 
transportation  sector rather than the distributional sector? Before initiating a 
debate about how to allocate them in our accounting  schemes, it must give 
one greater pause to learn that they hardly count at all in our statistics today. 
My guess is that the most workable general approach to measuring distri- 
butional  services is to treat them  as intermediate  products  in the consumer 
production of utility through the economics of home production.  To be sure, 
problems abound in this approach, and it is obvious that many of  them will 
not have easy answers. Yet  in setting up the essential nature of the problem, 
Walter Oi’s paper will serve as an important element in solving it. 